It’s the weather, stupid! Individual participation in collective May Day demonstrations by Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
It’s the weather, stupid! Individual
participation in collective May Day
demonstrations
Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard
University of Copenhagen
2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27891/
MPRA Paper No. 27891, posted 7. January 2011 20:48 UTC
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1697737
It’s the weather, stupid!
Individual participation in collective May Day
demonstrations1
PETER KURRILD-KLITGAARD
Dept. of Political Science, University of Copenhagen
Abstract. We investigate the possible explanations of variations in aggregate
levels of participation in large-scale political demonstrations. A simple public
choice inspired model is applied to data derived from the annual May Day
demonstrations of the Danish labour movement and socialist parties taking
place in Copenhagen in the period 1980-2009. The most important explanatory
variables are variations in the weather conditions. Political and socio-economic
conditions exhibit few or no robust effects.
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1. Introduction
The number of participants taking part in political demonstrations is
usually seen as an indication of the extent of popular support for the
cause addressed by the demonstration. If there are many, “the
people” supports it, and if there are few they do not; if there are
more than last time a comparable demonstration took place, popular
support is on the rise, and if there are fewer it is waning.
Or so the popular logic would seem to go. However,
demonstrations are instances of large-scale collective action where
the participation of the average supporter will make no difference
for the outcome, and where the benefit produced by the
demonstration itself constitutes a “public good” which will be
shared by all sympathizers, irrespective of whether they take part or
not. In contrast, the costs of participating in the demonstration are
concentrated and private. So, why should rational individuals
demonstrate, when they know that there at least some personal
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given by Mancur Olson and scholars of his ilk is that rational
individuals should not participate in large-scale collective action—at
least not in the absence of what he termed “selective incentives”, i.e.,
carrots and sticks (private benefits attached to participation itself or
private costs attached to non-participation). We should, in other
words, not expect political variables or for that matter general socio-
economic trends to have any significant impact on, say, political
demonstrations, but rather that the dynamics of such will be driven
exclusively by changes in the private costs and benefits of
participation.
Many attempts have been made at applying an Olsonian logic to
demonstrations and protests (e.g., DeNardo 1985; Finkel, Muller &
Opp 1989; Opp 1989; Kuran 1989; Kuran 1991; Opp 1991; Oberschall
1994; Kuran 1995; Kurrild-Klitgaard 1997; cf. Lichbach 1995; Kurrild-
Klitgaard 2004). However, there are at least two serious
methodological problems with regard to empirically investigating
whether Olson’s theory holds up when applied to demonstrations:
(1) Micro-level data are usually not accessible, and (2) it is veryPDF Creator - PDF4Free v2.0                                                    http://www.pdf4free.com
4seeking to empirically analyze participation in demonstrations have
tended to be either somewhat anecdotal macro-narratives (e.g.,
Tullock 1971; Tullock 1974) or have relied on survey data which
given the nature of demonstrations will tend to be ex post and
potentially with considerable problems relating to representativity
or ex post rationalization (e.g., Finkel, Muller & Opp 1989).
In the present study we shall try to tackle this in a new way and
with a novel type of data, namely by looking at May Day
demonstrations such as those organized by labour unions and
socialist parties in many countries each year on May 1st since the late
19th century.2 These share the rather unique feature that they have
been taking place regularly, over long time periods, organized by
groups with basically very similar ideological beliefs, under the
same set of symbols, at the exact same time of the year, and often at
the same locations. As such May Day demonstrations are probably
as close to a natural experiment as may be found in this area of
research. What vary then are the socio-economic and political
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affect individual participation.
2. The data
In the following we seek to test alternative explanations of variation
in the extent of collective participation in May Day
demonstrations—specifically the annual May Day demonstrations
organized by the Danish socialist parties and labour unions in
Copenhagen, which is the country’s largest May Day celebration.
These are highly institutionalized, ritual phenomena which have
been taking place since 1890 at Nørre Fælled (“Northern Commons”),
later Fælledparken (“The Commons Park”), which for decades had
been the meeting place of left-wing demonstrators and where on the
5th of May 1872 a rather dramatic clash took place between socialist
agitators and armed police. May Day is not a public holiday, but
many employees have the half or full day off due to agreements
with the employers, and at many Danish workplaces—including the
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participation is usually sought justified by appeals to the difference
participation may make with regard to achieving the public good of
a “better” society, as evidenced from a recent historical overview by
Danish national labour movement (LO):
”May 1st is the most important day of demonstration and celebration of the
labour movement. On May 1st workers in most parts of the world
demonstrate and express opinions about better working and living
conditions, cleaner working environment and greater political freedom.
… It is still the day where you express your solidarity with the oppressed
and opposition to war. … Under all circumstances, it is good to show up.
The world is constantly changing, and there will always be a need for
political and organizational action in order to change it to a better and
more just world.” (LO 2006: 2 & 11; author’s translation)
Similar sentiments are frequently aired by speakers at May Day
demonstrations, e.g., the Social Democratic party leader, Ms. Helle
Thorning-Schmidt, in 2009:PDF Creator - PDF4Free v2.0                                                    http://www.pdf4free.com
7It is a day where we can show and signal, that we stand together in
defense of important values.”3
May Day demonstrations are, in other words, to this day presented
as important causes, where individual participation will have
consequences for the realization of joint political goals. In contrast,
a pure public choice analysis would, as indicated, suggest that
variables representing public goods in practice are of no importance,
whereas variables measuring the private benefits and costs of
participating would be the important ones (and have positive and
negative signs respectively). In order to test these alternative
explanations, we will assume that individuals considering whether
or not to join a demonstration may be motivated by the value of the
public good itself, by the symbolic or “moral” value of participating,
and by the private benefits and costs of participating. Specifically,
we will assume that an individual’s utility of participation in a
demonstration, P, may be defined through the function:
U(P) = f(V, B, D, C, E, Q),
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a measure of the individual’s efficacy, and Q is some set of further
factors that potentially may influence the utility of participating (cf.,
e.g., Mueller 2003).
2.1. The dependent variable
The dependent variable of the analysis is the number of participants
in the May Day demonstrations in the Fælledpark (cf. Table 1, which
contains descriptive statistics for all the data considered as well as
the sources). These figures are, where possible, obtained from the
Copenhagen Police Department, which on a regular basis estimates
the number of participants in demonstrations. However, the Police
do not keep such records permanently and so missing data have
been supplemented with observations collected from the coverage
of the demonstrations by Danish newspapers, which in turn usually
has been based on the estimations of the Police Department. If there
is a divergence between the two, the Police estimate has been used.
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participants was ca. 250,000, corresponding to roughly 5 pct. of the
country’s population and approximately ¼ of the metropolitan
area’s total population.
2.2. The independent variables
In order to examine the factors potentially determining the variation
in number of participants at the May Day demonstration, a number
of independent variables will be considered, all of them in the form
of “objective”, non-survey based data. The first part of the statistical
analysis presents simple bi-variate correlations between the
dependent variable and all other variables considered. The second
part consists of standard ordinary least squares multiple regression
analyses. Because of the relatively small number of observations in
the data set, the analysis will need to limit the number of variables
included in the multiple regression analysis, and we accordingly
adopt an estimation strategy, where we first test a baseline model
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which can explain most of the variation solely with statistically
significant variables.
Following the outlined utility function, the baseline model will
include (a) unemployment (as a measure of the “public bad” to be
removed by collective action by the unions and the left-wing); (b)
the ideological colour of the ruling government (as an indication of
the “moral” duty of participation); (b) the weather (as a measure of
the private benefits from participating); (d) the day (as a measure of
the private costs of participating); and (e) the strength of the labour
unions (as an inverse proxy of the individual participant’s efficacy):
· Unemployment, i.e., the number of unemployed Danes. Concerns
for achieving as high a level of employment as possible have
always been among the stated top-priorities of the labour unions,
and indeed of the socialist parties, and may reasonably be seen as
the over-all public good sought after by the organized left.
Everything else being equal, a traditional argument would be
that high employment is a public good and hence that morePDF Creator - PDF4Free v2.0                                                    http://www.pdf4free.com
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ideological colour of the government might mobilize its
opponents. Again an Olsonian analysis would suggest that this
will be a purpose that as a public good is open to free-riding, but
for the present purposes, we will assume that left-voting Danes
will see it as a form of moral duty—something giving them a
participation related satisfaction—to demonstrate against a non-
socialist government, irrespective of any political effects.
Accordingly, we will expect, everything else being equal, that a
non-socialist government is associated with higher number of
participants, while the opposite is the case for a socialist
government.
· Weather: The May Day weather could reasonably be seen as
potentially entering into both the private benefits and private
costs of the calculus of participants. If the weather is cold and
wet, it will be uncomfortable, while if it is warm and sunny the
demonstration itself may be a pleasure.5 We therefore expect that
temperatures will be positively correlated with the number of
participants.6 For purposes of analysis we have tested severalPDF Creator - PDF4Free v2.0                                                    http://www.pdf4free.com
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different temperature variables: daily minimum temperatures, daily
maximum temperatures and average temperatures based in a simple
average of the two former. Similar expectations apply to the
number of hours of sunshine, while the reverse goes for the
amount of rain. For the latter we have included both the
measured amount of rain (rain (millimetres)) and a dummy for
whether or not there has been rain (rain (dummy)). Finally, we
have constructed an interaction variable, appropriately termed
good weather, which multiplies minimum temperatures,
maximum temperatures and number of sunshine hours.
· Workday: May 1st will fall either on an ordinary workday or on a
day where employees have the day off (weekends, national and
religious holidays, etc.). Participation is always costly, even if the
cost is low—either because it conflicts with work, or because it
takes time away from other private activities. On the other hand,
if leisure is a good, using an opportunity to take time off from
work (when possible), may actually be a private benefit. For the
present purposes we will expect the private costs to be higher ifPDF Creator - PDF4Free v2.0                                                    http://www.pdf4free.com
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· Labour union strength: Two opposing hypotheses may be
compared by considering labour union strength. A more classic,
pluralist approach would suggest that larger special interest
groups would lead to more participation, while the Olsonian
analyses would suggest that the larger a group is, the less effect a
typical participant will have on any outcome, and the more
rational it will be to free-ride. Everything else being equal, one
would expect larger labour unions to be better at mobilizing
larger number of demonstrators—or alternatively that larger
labour unions would make free-riding more attractive (and
easier).
2.3. The control variables
In order to control for spurious correlations, the statistical analysis
also includes a number of alternative control variables, which
conceivably could be of importance, although they do not all fit any
particular theoretical explanation of collective action:
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the number of people participating in the most important annual
event of the political left.
· Number of socialist parties: While the electoral strength of the left-
wing can be important, its organizational basis may also be.
Everything else being equal we expect a larger number of parties
to be better at mobilizing potential sympathizers and therefore
expect a positive correlation between the number of socialist
parties and the number of May Day demonstrators.
· Labour conflict: A large number of work-days lost to labour
conflicts indicate a high level of social conflict and a well-
organized labour movement, and a case of the latter will be better
able to mobilize many demonstrators. We therefore expect a
positive correlation between number of days lost to strikes and
the number of May Day participants.
· Prosperity: A standard theory in much of 20th century voting
analysis has been that if living standards are poor, voters may be
seen as being more willing to protest (and perhaps especially to
support the political left), while higher living standards mightPDF Creator - PDF4Free v2.0                                                    http://www.pdf4free.com
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participation in May Day demonstrations. We accordingly
hypothesize that lower (higher) economic growth (measured as
change from previous year’s GDP) will result in higher (lower)
turnout.
· Government size: Conceivably the left’s demonstrations may be
influenced by the extent to which the public sector realizes the
left’s political program. We therefore expect that public sector
size (measured by the tax levels, i.e., total taxes and percentage of
GDP) will exhibit a negative correlation with the number of May
Day demonstrators.
· Fall of the Soviet Union: Since at least one prominent left-wing
party, the Danish Communist Party (DKP), was financed partly
by a foreign state, and simultaneously hosted one of the largest
factions of the annual May Day demonstrations, the collapse of
the Communist regimes that took place 1989-1991 may be seen as
potentially having had a negative effect on turnout.7 Also, the
fall of so many regimes having an at least self-proclaimed
socialist nature might be seen as potentially depressing effect onPDF Creator - PDF4Free v2.0                                                    http://www.pdf4free.com
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the Soviet Union disintegrated, and our expectation is a negative
correlation.
· Bandwagon effect: Collective action may exhibit so-called
“bandwagon effects”,8 where participants make their own
participation dependent on their expectations of how many
others will participate, and where these expectations are formed
on the basis of prior events. For the present purposes we expect
that the number of participants in a given year will be related to
the number of participants in the previous year, so that a high
(low) level in year t2 will correlate with a high (low) level in year
t1.
· Trend: There are well-known potential problems related to the
use of time-series data in OLS-multiple regression analysis. For
that purpose we have included a trend-line as a simple control of
whether participation has systematically declined over time.
3. The analysis
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coefficients, a very large number of them have the expected signs.
More rain, post-Soviet Union era, higher living standards and
higher economic growth go with lower turnout. More sunshine,
higher temperatures, a strong and well-organized left-wing, more
union members, more unemployed and high turnout the previous
year all go with bigger crowds. But a number of variables do not
have the expected signs—for example higher labour conflict levels,
more right-leaning governments, and whether May 1st falls on a
workday go with lower participation, while bigger government goes
with higher.
However, more importantly, if we look not simply at the signs of
the coefficients but also at statistical significance, almost none of the
correlations are statistically significant—that is, except the weather
variables (the three different temperature measures, the number of
sunshine hours and the rain dummy, but not the amount of rain).
All other correlations are statistically insignificant. To appreciate
the strength of the possible effect of weather conditions on turnout,
the scatter plot of Figure 2 correlates the most highly statisticallyPDF Creator - PDF4Free v2.0                                                    http://www.pdf4free.com
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labour union strength variables. Over-all the coefficients all have
the hypothesized signs: More unemployed, non-left governments,
more labour union members, more sunshine hours and higher
temperatures, and whether May 1st falls on a regular workday all
correlate positively with higher turnout. The total amount of
variation explained is far from trivial (adj. R2 = 0.494). However,
virtually all explanatory power of the baseline model stems from the
two only variables whose coefficients are statistically significant:
The temperature and the sunshine. This is illustrated by a
regression analysis with only these two variables included (model
2), which has only a slightly less good fit (adj. R2 = 0.479). In
virtually all subsequent models the four other variables of the
baseline model are statistically insignificant: The colour of the
government, labour union strength and workday are never
significant (and the latter two often change signs), and
unemployment is only occasionally so. These results, in other
words, cannot be seen as corroborating any public goods or “moral
duty” explanation of political participation: Neither the ideology ofPDF Creator - PDF4Free v2.0                                                    http://www.pdf4free.com
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them display statistically insignificant coefficients. For example,
when applied individually to the baseline-model the amount of
labour conflict is not correlated to a statistically significant extent
with May Day turnout (model 3), and neither is government size
(model 4), rain (model 5), an assumption that there simply has been
an over-all systematic trend of lower participation as time goes by
(model 6), the fall of the Soviet Union (model 7), the income levels
(model 9), the number of socialist parties (model 11) or the left’s
electoral strength (model 12). Only two control-variables come out
statistically significant: Economic growth has the expected
(negative) relationship with turnout and at a statistically significant
level (model 10), just as there seems to be a possible “bandwagon
effect” of participation (model 8).
The best fitting model, in the sense of the model with the highest
explanatory power and with all coefficients statistically significant,
is one relying solely on temperatures, sunshine, fall of the Soviet
Union, unemployment and economic growth (model 13), which
together explains 66 pct. of the variation in turnout,9 and with mostPDF Creator - PDF4Free v2.0                                                    http://www.pdf4free.com
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decreases it. Government size, however, exhibits an unexpected
positive correlation with turnout, which is statistically significant in
the best-fit model but not robust to other specifications. If taken at it
is, it suggests that more distribution will go hand in hand with
higher turnout. It is difficult to say for the present how that should
be explained, although it would be consistent with a Say’s Law
interpretation of the demand for and supply of public expenditures:
That a supply of more government begets demands for a yet larger
government.
It is important to stress that of the variables of the baseline model
only the weather variables remain statistically important when
control variables are added: Temperatures are statistically
significant across all model specifications, while sunshine is so in the
vast majority.10 Of the other baseline model variables only
unemployment occasionally is statistically significant but not
consistently so. In fact, over a large set of regressions (not reported
but obtainable from the author) only temperatures remain
statistically significant, irrespective of what other variables arePDF Creator - PDF4Free v2.0                                                    http://www.pdf4free.com
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How should the importance of the non-weather related variables
be interpreted? Clearly, there is some indication that poor socio-
economic conditions (higher unemployment, lower economic
growth) have the hypothesized positive effect on turnout, so May
Day demonstrators could be seen as reacting to economic crisis (or
their opposites) to some extent. However, the effect is, as seen, far
from robust, at least in the case of unemployment, and in a relative
perspective the effects are less than impressive: In model 13 the
effect of a one percent change in annual economic growth is only
slightly higher than the effect of a one degree change in temperature
and less than that of two hours of sunshine. Similarly, the less than
statistically robust unemployment variable would need to exhibit an
increase of ca. 50,000 unemployed workers before the effect on
participation would exceed that of a one degree change in
temperature.
All in all, the analysis suggests that there will always be some
turnout at May Day demonstrations, by the dedicated idealists—but
how many will turn out in total depend not least on the weather—PDF Creator - PDF4Free v2.0                                                    http://www.pdf4free.com
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will affect turnout by ca. 4,100-5,800, depending on the specific
model. That weather may be so important for political participation
may surprise some, but really should not: A number of other studies
have applied weather data for the explanation of turnout on election
days and have found the expected relationships: That weather
conditions may have a significant effect on turnout, especially at the
margin (Merrifield 1993; Matsusaka & Palda 1999; Gomez, Hansford
& Krause 2007; cf. Knack 1994). What is most surprising here is not
the relationship but that it has such an extraordinarily strong and
robust effect.
4. Conclusion
The previous analysis suggests that the public good factors usually
assumed to rationalize individual participation in such collective
demonstrations as those on May Day are, at best, non-robust or
trivial. There is, at least in the case considered, no support for
claims that turnout at such demonstrations can be explained by, e.g.,
PDF Creator - PDF4Free v2.0                                                    http://www.pdf4free.com
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strength of the labour unions or by purely partisan or ideological
factors (e.g., the strength of the left-wing parties or the colour of the
government). In other words, politics largely disappears. The only
political factor with visible effects is the fall of the Soviet Union and
what importance this may have had for the annual feast of the
socialist left. The most important factors for the explanation of
turnout seems to be whether the weather is sufficiently pleasant for
people to fight for what they believe is a better and more just
society.
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Table 1. Variables and descriptive statistics.
Variables Description N Mean Standard
deviation
Min. Max. Sources
Dependent
variable
Participation Participants in May Day celebrations in Fælledparken,
Copenhagen, number
30 72,500 61,542.67 15,000 250,000 1980-2000: Berlingske Tidende (newspaper); 2001-
2009: Copenhagen Police Department.
Independent
variables
Colour of government Dummy (centre-right government: 1; no: 0) 30 0.60 0.50 0 1 Parliament Hansard
Unemployment Unemployed, number on annual basis 29 189,332.17 68,788.83 80,270 323,437 Danmarks Statistik (Statistisk Tiårsoversigt 1991,
1992, 1997, 2007; Statistikbanken online)
Temperature, min. Daily minimum number of Celsius degrees 30 11.12 4.81 4.00 22.30 Danish Meteorological Institute
Temperature, max. Daily maximum number of Celsius degrees 30 10.92 3.93 2.90 18.10 Danish Meteorological Institute
Temperature, average
(min./max.)
Average of daily minimum and maximum number of
Celsius degrees
30 11.17 2.68 5.55 17.15 Own calculations
Sunshine Sunshine, number of hours 30 7.28 4.66 0 13.90 Danish Meteorological Institute
Rain (millimetres) Rain, millimetres 30 0.75 1.65 0 7.00 Danish Meteorological Institute
Rain (dummy) Rain, dummy (no millimeters: 0; more than 0 millimeters:
1)
30 0.27 0.45 0 1 Own calculations
Good weather Interaction (min. temp. * max. temp. * [sunshine hours +
1])
30 1,093.90 956.46 31.20 4,324.30 Own calculations
Workday Dummy (no: 0; yes: 1) 30 0.73 0.45 0 1 Own observations
Control
variables
Left-wing vote share Votes for left-wing parties§ as pct. of all votes cast in most
recent national parliamentary election
30 45.03 4.88 35.50 50.10 Parliament website
Socialist parties Number of socialist§ participating in most recent national
parliamentary election
30 4.93 1.62 3 9 Parliament website
Labour union strength Members of the national Labour Union (LO), millions. 30 1.40 0.08 1.22 1.51 Danmarks Statistik (Statistisk Tiårsoversigt 1981,
1997, 2007; Statistikbanken online)
Labour conflict Workdays lost to labour conflicts, number on annual basis 29 362,755.17 753,607.71 51,300 3,173,000 Danmarks Statistik (Statistisk Tiårsoversigt 1991,
1997, 2007; Nyt fra Danmarks Statistik 2009)
Prosperity Real GDP per cap., Danish Kroner (constant 1990 prices) 30 215,028.21 34,860.65 157,726 270,403 IMF World Economic Outlook 2008
Economic growth Year-to-year change in real GDP per cap., Danish Kroner
(constant 1990 prices)
29 1.86 1.66 -0.93 5,20 IMF World Economic Outlook 2008
Government size Total taxes, etc., as pct. of GDP 30 47.65 2.37 41.60 51.00 Danish Treasury, August 2009
Fall of the Soviet Union Dummy (prior to December 1991: 0; after: 1) 30 0.60 0.50 0 1 Own observations
Bandwagon Participants in May Day demonstrations in Fælledparken,
Copenhagen, previous year, number
29 71,206.90 62,215.86 15,000 250,000 Cf. above.
Trend Monotonically increasing value 30 15.50 8.80 1 30 Own calculations
§ Social Democrats, Socialist People’s Party (SF), Danish Communist Party (DKP), Left-Socialists (VS), Socialist Unity List (EL), Socialist Workers’ Party (SAP), Communist Workers’ Party (KAP), Marxist-Leninist Party (MLP),
Common Course (FK), etc.
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Figure 1. Estimated number of participants in Copenhagen May Day demonstrations, 1980-2009.
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Table 2. Bi-variate correlation analyses, all variables considered: Correlation with no. of participants.
Variable Pearson correlation coefficient
(significance, 2-tailed)
N
Good weather (interaction min. temp. * max. temp. * sunshine) 0.761 (0.000)**** 30
Temperature, average (max./min.) 0.653 (0.000)**** 30
Temperature, max. 0.644 (0.000)**** 30
Temperature, min. 0.561 (0.001)**** 30
Sunshine 0.530 (0.003)**** 30
Rain (dummy) -0.374 (0.042)*** 30
Left-wing vote share 0.297 (0.111) 30
Bandwagon 0.295 (0.120) 29
Economic growth -0.272 (0.152) 29
Labour union strength 0.231 (0.219) 30
Unemployment 0.224 (0.243) 29
Rain (millimetres) -0.221 (0.241) 30
Socialist parties 0.190 (0.314) 30
Fall of the Soviet Union -0.174 (0.357) 30
Government size 0.158 (0.405) 30
Prosperity -0.151 (0.424) 30
Trend -0.133 (0.483) 30
Labour conflict -0.103 (0.596) 29
Colour of government -0.045 (0.813) 30
Workday -0.021 (0.912) 30
* p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. **** p < 0.005.
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Figure 2. Correlation between good weather interaction variable (min. temperature * max. temperature * sunshine hours) and esti-
mated number of participants in May Day demonstrations in Copenhagen, 1980-2009.
0
50.000
100.000
150.000
200.000
250.000
300.000
0 500 1.000 1.500 2.000 2.500 3.000 3.500 4.000 4.500 5.000
Good weather interaction (min.temp. * max.temp. * sunshine hours)
Pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s
P
D
F 
C
re
at
or
 - 
P
D
F4
Fr
ee
 v
2.
0 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.p
df
4f
re
e.
co
m
28
Table 3. OLS multiple regression analyses. Dependent variable: Number of participants in May Day protests in Fælledparken,
Copenhagen, 1980-2009. Unstandardized coefficients (t-values).
Variables Model 1
(Baseline
model)
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13
Colour of government 17,441.23
(0.75)
- 15,545.21
(-0.62)
15,369.85
(0.62)
12,977.89
(0.53)
18,594.59
(0.78)
9,714.62
(0.42)
12,658.47
(0.58)
19,178.32
(0.81)
21,259.42
(0.96)
13,130.14
(0.54)
28,704.82
(1.16)
-
Unemployment 0.24
(1.63)
- 0.24
(1.56)
0.28
(1.37)
0.28*
(1.76)
0.14
(0.65)
0.09
(0.53)
0.19
(1.39)
0.10
(0.43)
0.28*
(1.95)
0.15
(0.85)
0.06
(0.27)
0.23*
(1.92)
Temperature, average
(min/max)
12,719.73****
(3.44)
12,068.10****
(3.61)
12,863.87****
(3.30)
12,543.88****
(3.28)
12,679.72****
(3.39)
12,681.87****
(3.38)
12,504.43****
(3.48)
13,384.73****
(3.91)
12,668.60****
(3.40)
10,892.88***
(3.00)
12,238.02****
(3.24)
11,862.35****
(3.19)
9,535.85***
(3.05)
Sunshine hours 5,254.41*
(2.01)
4,556.97**
(2.22)
4,926.47
(1.60)
5,198.93*
(1.95)
4,300.40
(1.46)
5,425.76*
(2.05)
5,505.55**
(2.17)
5,241.10**
(2.18)
5,461.17*
(2.07)
5,820.97**
(2.34)
5,474.33*
(2.07)
5,547.20**
(2.14)
5,870.25***
(3.12)
Workday 171.43
(0.01)
- 406.89
(0.02)
1,568.73
(0.08)
680.69
(0.04)
-1,918.76
(-0.10)
-4,450.32
(-0.24)
-4,505.52
(-0.26)
-1,898.05
(-0.1)
-3,221.67
(-0.18)
644.21
(0.03)
-2,091.50
(-0.11) -
Labour union strength 11,920.75
(0.08)
- 16,951.91
(0.09)
-31,609.65
(-0.15)
-45,806.22
(-0.26)
38,053.76
(0.24)
87,413.37
(0.56)
-81,445.62
(-0.55)
49,764.08
(0.31)
51,936.68
(0.35)
44,182.21
(0.28)
37,387.63
(0.24) -
Labour conflict - - -0.00
(-0.31)
- - - - - - - - - -
Government size - - - 1,767.19
(0.29)
- - - - - - - - 8,481.47*
(1.97)
Rain (dummy) - - - - -17,477.87
(-0.72)
- - - - - - - -
Trend - - - - - -1,009.16
(-0.69)
- - - - - - -
Fall of the Soviet Union - - - - - - -32,939.46
(-1.56)
- - - - - -51,187.06**
(-2.68)
Bandwagon - - - - - - - 0.31**
(2.21)
- - - - -
Prosperity - - - - - - - - -0.33
(-0.84)
- - - -
Economic growth - - - - - - - - - -9,810.87*
(-1.88)
- - -10,328.36**
(-2.30)
Socialist parties - - - - - - - - - - 6,414.39
(0.83)
- -
Left-wing vote share - - - - - - - - - - - 3,429.50
(1.25)
-
Constant -182,931.84
(-0.90)
-95,642.98**
(-2.71)
-187,174.82
(-0.76)
-211,178.51
(-0.92)
-93,803.81
(-0.39)
-184,219.64
(-0.89)
-232,067.45
(-1.16)
-65,322.74
(-0.33)
-137,842.66
(-0.65)
-211,438.76
(-1.09)
-232,401.74
(-1.09)
-335,741.28
(-1.42)
-476,037.85**
(-2.45)
N 29 29 28 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
R2 (adjust.) 0.494 0.479 0.459 0.472 0.482 0.481 0.525 0.570 0.486 0.546 0.486 0.506 0.661
Std. errors 44,465.64 44,427.58 46,497.07 45,418.74 44,966.24 45,011.62 43,081.03 40,980.20 44,774.45 42,099.81 44,791.42 43,920.25 36,357.14
F-test 5.55**** 14.32**** 4.27*** 4.57**** 4.72**** 4.71**** 5.14**** 6.30**** 4.79**** 5.81**** 4.78**** 5.10**** 10.12****
* p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. **** p < 0.005.
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